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U.S. vs. Stewart: Two Opinions
Abstract
Lynne Stewart was counsel for Sheikh Abdel Rahman during his 1995 trial when he was convicted of
“seditious conspiracy to wage a war of urban terrorism against the United States” and of “soliciting crimes of
violence against the United States military and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak” (Stewart 4). Rahman was
considered to be a leader of the Islamic Group (IG), which was designated as a foreign terrorist organization
by the State
Department in 1997. Stewart continued to act as Rahman’s counsel after his trial. In 1998, Special
Administrative Measures (SAMs) were imposed on Rahman to halt his communication with IG. The SAMs
included restrictions on Rahman’s access to mail, the telephone, and visitors, and prohibited him from
speaking with the media. Stewart was asked to abide by and sign these SAMs, which she did in May 1998. In
doing so, she agreed “not to use ‘meetings, correspondence, or phone calls with Abdel Rahman to pass
messages between
third parties (including, but not limited to, the media) and Abdel Rahman’” (Stewart 5). In April 2002,
Ahmed Abdel Sattar,Yassir Al-Sirri,Mohammed Yousry and Lynne Stewart were charged with a five-count
indictment. Stewart was charged on Counts One (“conspiring to provide material support and resources to a
foreign terrorist organization (FTO)”), Two (“providing and attempting to provide material support and
resources to an FTO”), Four (“conspiring to defraud the United States”) and Five (Stewart alone was charged
with “making false statements”). These charges held that the defendants had violated the SAMs as well as the
1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) which made it illegal to provide, or attempt to
provide,“material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization” (AEDPA).
Professor Simeone’s assignment for his Constitutional Law II class was as follows: “Write a 650-800 word
essay on the following topic: Lynne Stewart stands convicted in U.S. District Court of violating the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) by providing ‘material support’ to the
Islamic Group, a State Department designated terrorist organization.You are an associate justice on the U.S.
Supreme Court and have been given the task of writing the opinion of the court by the chief justice.”
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Lynne Stewart was counsel for Sheikh Abdel Rahman during his 1995 trial when he
was convicted of “seditious conspiracy to wage a war of urban terrorism against the United
States” and of “soliciting crimes of violence against the United States military and Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak” (Stewart 4). Rahman was considered to be a leader of the
Islamic Group (IG), which was designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the State
Department in 1997. Stewart continued to act as Rahman’s counsel after his trial. In 1998,
Special Administrative Measures (SAMs) were imposed on Rahman to halt his communi-
cation with IG. The SAMs included restrictions on Rahman’s access to mail, the telephone,
and visitors, and prohibited him from speaking with the media. Stewart was asked to abide
by and sign these SAMs, which she did in May 1998. In doing so, she agreed “not to use
‘meetings, correspondence, or phone calls with Abdel Rahman to pass messages between
third parties (including, but not limited to, the media) and Abdel Rahman’” (Stewart 5). In
April 2002, Ahmed Abdel Sattar, Yassir Al-Sirri, Mohammed Yousry and Lynne Stewart
were charged with a five-count indictment. Stewart was charged on Counts One (“conspir-
ing to provide material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organization (FTO)”),
Two (“providing and attempting to provide material support and resources to an FTO”),
Four (“conspiring to defraud the United States”) and Five (Stewart alone was charged with
“making false statements”). These charges held that the defendants had violated the SAMs
as well as the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) which made it
illegal to provide, or attempt to provide,“material support or resources to a foreign terror-
ist organization” (AEDPA).
Professor Simeone’s assignment for his Constitutional Law II class was as follows:
“Write a 650-800 word essay on the following topic: Lynne Stewart stands convicted in
U.S. District Court of violating the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) by providing ‘material support’ to the Islamic Group, a State Department desig-
nated terrorist organization. You are an associate justice on the U.S. Supreme Court and
have been given the task of writing the opinion of the court by the chief justice.”
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MS. JUSTICE BANNERMAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Lynne Stewart was convicted in the US District Court of violating the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)1. Stewart aided her client, Sheikh Abdel
Rahman, in communicating with the declared terrorist group, IG2, while he was impris-
oned and under “Special Administrative Measures (‘SAMs’)3” (5). In doing so, Stewart vio-
lated the SAMs and the AEDPA. She made herself a tool to facilitate communication, as
stated in the indictment, by, in May of 2000, hiring an interpreter, Mohammed Yousry, who
was affiliated with IG and allowing him to read letters to Rahman concerning IG matters.
She “took affirmative steps to conceal” (7) these discussions from the prison’s guards, and by
doing this nullified any claim she could have made of being unaware of what was being
done be her interpreter. She then later directly responded to some of the questions the
interpreter had asked Rahman by, again in direct violation of the SAMs she had signed two
years previously, making a statement to the media that Rahman no longer supported the
cease-fire in Egypt. Through these actions she provided material support to IG, directly vio-
lating AEDPA 2339B and bringing bodily harm to other humans.
It has been argued by opponents to Stewart’s conviction that she was within her First
Amendment rights to speak to the media and that the SAMs themselves, along with
AEDPA, were unconstitutional because they imposed on her First Amendment rights as
well as on Rahman’s by limiting their ability to pure speech. However, under the clear and
present danger test established in Schenck v United States4, Congress has a right to limit
speech, even pure speech, to protect against imminent danger and “the ban does not restrict
an organization’s or an individuals ability to freely express a particular ideology or political
philosophy. Those inside the United States will continue to be free to advocate, think and
profess the attitudes and philosophies of the foreign organizations. They are simply not
allowed to send material support or resources to those groups, or their subsidiary groups
over seas” (14). Stewart was free to express her own beliefs on the cease-fire, if her
announcement to the press had been that she no longer supported the cease-fire in Egypt
that would have been fine, but it was Rahman’s opinion she was expressing and not her
own. She therefore was providing a resource to IG, not merely exercising her right to free
speech. Rahman was convicted in October of 1995 for “engaging in a seditious conspiracy
to wage a war of urban terrorism against the United States, including the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing and a plot against New York City landmarks. He was also found guilty of
soliciting crimes or violence against the United States military and Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak.” (4) It is within the interest of avoiding clear and present dangers that the
SAMs were imposed to effectively sever Rahman’s ability to serve as a leader of the IG and
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1 Which declares:“Whoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, knowingly pro-
vides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both” (2339B)
2 Also known as “ ‘Gama’s al-Islamiyya’ a/k/a ‘IG’ a/k/a ‘al-Gama’at’ a/k/a ‘Islamic Gama’at’ a/k/a ‘Egyptian al-Gama’at al
Islamiyya’…[which] existed as an international terrorist group dedicated to opposing nations, governments, institu-
tions, and individuals who did not share IG’s radical interpretation of Islamic law…” (2)
3 “The SAMs limited certain privileges in order to protect ‘ ‘persons against risk of death or serious bodily injury’ that
might otherwise result.’ The limitations included restrictions on Sheikh Abdel Rhaman’s access to the mail, the tele-
phone, and visitors, and prohibited him from speaking with the media.All counsel for Sheik Abdel Rahman were
obligated to sign an affirmation acknowledging that they and their staff would abide fully to the SAMs before being
allowed access to their client. In affirmation, counsel agreed to ‘only be accompanied by translators for the purpose of
communicating with the inmate Abdel Rahman concerning legal matters.’ Since at least in or about May 1998, coun-
sel agreed not to use ‘meetings, correspondence, or phone calls with Abdel Rahman to pass messages between third
parties (including, but not limited to, the media) and Abdel Rahman.” (6)
4 “The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is
a question of proximity and degree.” (Schenck 52)
therefore reducing their threat. Through her actions, Stewart bypassed these protections to
the state and in doing so reactivated this clear and present danger.“The First Amendment
does not protect violence” (NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 916). Stewart’s statement
was directly instigating acts of violence in Egypt, where, under the direction of Rahman,
IG would end the cease-fire. Though opponents argue that this does not constitute clear
and present danger because it is not within the United States, this is not a correct state-
ment. Egypt and the US are close allies and are tied closely economically as well. If the vio-
lence were to escalate any harm caused to Egypt would also affect the US and if violence
were to escalate to the point where intervention was needed, it would be likely that the US
would be entered into the conflict. Not only is there a clear and present danger in Egypt
that would involve US interests, but if Rahman is able to actively communicate to IG from
prison then there is direct danger to the US. Rahman was charged, as previously stated, for
directly threatening violence in the US. If he is able to communicate plans and orders to
IG the effectiveness of imprisoning Rahman is undermined and the IG could easily bring
violence to the US. Stewart went much farther than an attorney has a right to when repre-
senting a client that clearly is a threat to US security. Five years after Rahman’s conviction
Stewart made a statement to the press that had nothing to do with getting him released
from prison, and in all actuality would probably do more to keep him there. She went
beyond her First Amendment protections and directly broke AEPDA and the SAMs, both
of which were in place to protect the United States from imminent dangers and were
therefore constitutional. The judgment of the lower courts is
Reversed.
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MR. JUSTICE KEMPER delivered the opinion of the Court.
In challenging the AEDPA of 1996, Stewart relies on three primary arguments. First,
she contends that the authority of the Secretary of State to designate terrorist groups cannot
be reviewed and, therefore, violates due process. I believe that the heart of this case lies else-
where and I am satisfied that the review of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia is sufficient to uphold due process (Humanitarian 2369).
Stewart’s other arguments, however, go to the essence of the 1996 Act. Stewart claims
that provisions outlawing “material support,” especially in the form of “personnel” infringe
on her constitutional rights of speech and association, and are unconstitutionally vague. In
considering these closely related claims it is essential to determine if the law was aimed at a
content expressive component of conduct and, therefore, strict scrutiny should be applied.
In fact, several logical considerations suggest that mere advocacy and association were
made illegal under this legislation. This Court has found financial support of “legitimate”
speech equal to speech under the First Amendment in other contexts (see Buckley v. Valeo).
Since money is accepted as a proxy for speech, prohibiting “material support” to designated
groups is no different that saying,“thou shall not advocate designated political goals.” This
logic leads into the realm of association as well. This Court said in Claiborne: “The right to
associate does not lose all constitutional protection merely because some members of the
group may have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not protected
(908).” As the Center for Constitutional Rights correctly contends in its amicus brief:
“[AEDPA] makes it a crime to provide any “material support” to a designated group, even
when that support is intended — and is in fact used — exclusively for lawful purposes, sim-
ply because others in the recipient group engaged in some unlawful activities (9).” Finally,
the vagueness of the “personnel” provision suggests that one cannot appoint oneself as a
spokesperson for the causes of designated groups. The ability to support a chosen cause
goes to the very nature of advocacy. If considered under strict scrutiny, the AEDPA must be
found unconstitutional, because it is not narrowly tailored.
The government makes a strong argument, however, that the AEDPA is aimed solely at
conduct and should be considered under intermediate scrutiny. This legislation does not
limit any particular type of speech or association, but is aimed at keeping resources out of
the hands of terrorists. The government correctly contends that the federal government has
the power to restrict U.S. citizens in dealing with foreign entities, the government has a
legitimate interest in preventing the spread of terrorism and this interest is unrelated to
suppressing First Amendment rights (Humanitarian 2366). Against the Appellate Court’s
ruling, the government also contends that the terms used in the AEDPA are specific enough
in dealing with terrorism. Simply put, all resources that aid terrorist groups naturally lead to
an imminent threat. As the Appellate Court correctly found in Humanitarian Law Project:
“…organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct
that any contribution to such an organization aids their unlawful goals (2358).”
Even if one accepts the intermediate scrutiny standard for evaluating the AEDPA,
however, the law fails to meet this standard. The vagueness of the terms “material support”
and, specifically, “personnel” leaves the incidental First Amendment restrictions of the
AEDPA far greater than necessary to achieve the government’s purpose. Precedent for eval-
uating individual action under a given statute emerges from the stream of thought that
originated with Justices Holmes and Brandeis in cases from Scheck to Abrams. As Justice
Vinson echoed in Dennis: “…where an offense is specified by a statute in [nonspeech
terms], a conviction relying upon [speech] as evidence of violation may be sustained only
when the [speech] created a “clear and present danger” of attempting or accomplishing the
prohibited crime (505).” This concept was clarified in Brandenburg to only include cases
where speech,“…is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
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to produce such action (447).” As applied to other rights in Claiborne, the government may
criminalize association alone only when,“…the group itself possessed unlawful goals and
that the individual held a specific intent to further those illegal aims (920).”
For a law restricting First Amendment rights to be constitutional, it must draw a clear
distinction between legal and illegal conduct when considered under these precedents. As
this Court stated in Dennis: “…it serves well to indicate to those who would advocate con-
stitutionally prohibited conduct that there is a line beyond which they may not go…(516).”
In Dennis, this Court upheld a vague statute because the defendant’s intent was clearly
within the scope of conduct that the government has the authority to prohibit. In this case,
it is unclear whether lawless action was imminent based on Stewart’s communication of
messages to IG. Moreover, it is unclear whether Stewart intended to further the legal or
illegal aims of this group. The facts of this case clearly indicate that AEDPA is unconstitu-
tionally vague and I must uphold the ruling of the Appellate Court. The judgment of the
lower courts is
Affirmed.
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